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NOTES
dictated by statute and public policy, will be compounded by the reluct-
ance of states to be sued in tort actions unless current inroads into the
doctrine of sovereign immunity are successful. Moreover, the hesitancy of
courts to place restrictions on the discretionary powers of prison officials
hampers the likelihood of favorable judicial action. To surmount these
problems a prisoner may sue under a claim of constitutional right. Even
this, however, would be ineffective unless he was specifically singled out
for maltreatment and not merely injured as an innocent bystander or
unless factual circumstances conclusively demonstrate that far greater
force than was reasonably necessary was employed to quell the insurrec-
tion.
THOMAS ALEXANDER GoSSE
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXCLUDING
YOUNG PEOPLE FROM JURY SERVICE
With the ratification of the twenty-sixth amendment' approximately
eleven million young persons have been granted the right to vote.2 This
group of young citizens, however, is still precluded from serving on federal
juries and many state juries because of statutory age criteria for jury
eligibility. 3 A practical effect of these statutes is to create a class of young
people who as defendants are too old to be tried in a juvenile court4 and
rrhe twenty-sixth amendment states in part:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years
of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any state on account of age.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XXVI. While there is no direct legal relationship between suffrage and
jury service, the ratification of the twenty-sixth amendment may promote a re-examination
of statutory ages for jury eligibility. For example, the Senate has recently passed a bill to
lower the age for federal jury service from 21 to 18. S. Res. 1975, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117
CONG. REc. S. 19925-29 (Dec. 1, 1971).
'Senate Judiciary Committee, S. Rep. No. 92-26, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. 362, 366 (197 1).
3See text accompanying notes 6 and 7 infra.
'The maximum age for juvenile jurisdiction in the federal system is 18. 18 U.S.C.
§ 5031 (1948). The maximum age in the states is as follows: ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(l)-
(3) (1959) (under 16); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a) (1971) (minor under 18); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 8-201(5) (Supp. 1971) (under age of 18); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-201 (Supp.
1969) (under age of 18); CAL. WVELF. & INST'NS CODE § 600 (1966) (under 21); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37-9-2(1) (1963) (under 21); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-53 (Supp. 197 1)
(under 16, 16-17 at discretion cir. ct. judge); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (1953) (under
18); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(b) (Supp. 1971) (under 17); GA. CODE ANN. § 2 4 -2 4 01(2)(c)
(1971) (less than 17); HAWAI REV. LAWS § 571-I1 (1) (Supp. 1970) (under 18); IDAHO CODE
1972]
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yet will not be able to have persons of their own age on the jury at a
criminal trial.5 Thus the question may be raised whether these statutes are
constitutional where they exclude this segment of society from jury ser-
vice.
The statute which excludes persons under the age of 21 from jury
service in the federal court system is the Jury Service and Selection Act
of 1968,1 which specifies that a person is not deemed qualified to serve
on a federal jury unless he is at least 21 years of age. 7 State statutes also
establish standards which restrict eligibility for jury service on the basis
of age.' While with the passage of the twenty-sixth amendment it appears
ANN. § 16-1802(c) (Supp. 1969) (less than 18); ILL. REV. STAT. § ch. 37, § 702-2 (Supp.
1971) (boy under 17, girl under 18); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3204 (Supp. 1971) (under 18);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.2(3) (1946) (less than 18); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-802(b) (Supp.
1970) (less than 18); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.020(1) (1969) (under 18); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 13:1569(3) (1968) (less than 17); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2502(4) (1964) (under
17); MD. CODE ANN. art. 26, § 70-1(c) (Supp. 1971) (under 18); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 119, § 52 (1965) (under 17); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (598.2)(a) (Supp. 1971) (under
17, crim. ct. option to 19); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(2) (1971) (under 18); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 7185-02(c) (Supp. 1968) (less than 18); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.021(2) (1962) (under
17); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-602(l) (1967) (less than 18); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
201(4) (1968) (under 18); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.020(i)(b) (1967) (less than 18); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169:2(111) (Supp. 1970) (under 18); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14 (Supp. 1971)
(under 18); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-20(d) (1953) (less than 18); N.Y. JUDICIARY CT. ACT
§ 712(a) (McKinney 1963) (less than 16); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(1) (Rep]. Vol. 1969)
(not reached 16); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(1) (Supp. 1971) (under 18); OIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.01(B)(1) (1964) (under 18); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (Supp.
1971-72) (male under 16, female under 18); ORE. REV. STAT. § 3.250(l) (1969) (under 18);
PA. STAT. tit. II, § 269-1(1) (1965) (under 18); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-3(C) (1969)
(under 18); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1171(2) (Supp. 1970) (under 17); S.D. CODE § 26-8-1(3)
(Supp. 1971) (less than 18); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-202(l) (Supp. 1970) (less than 18); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 3 (197 1) (male under 17, female under 18); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 55-10-64(3) (Supp. 1971) (less than 18); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 632(a)(1) (Supp. 1971)
(under 16); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-141(3) (Repl. Vol. 1960) (under 18); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 13.04.010 (1956) (under 18); W. 'VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-2 (1966) (under 18); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.02(3) (1957) (under 18); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.2(e) (Supp. 1971)
(under 18). See also Appendix infra.
'See Appendix infra.
628 U.S.C. §§ 1861 etseq. (Supp. 1971).
728 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (Supp. 1971).
'ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 21 (Supp. 1969) (not under 21); ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.010
(Supp. 1971) (at least 19); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-301(a) (Supp. 1970) (registered
voter); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-101 (Supp. 1969) (registered voter); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE
§ 198 (West 1954) (of age of 21); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-I-I (1963) (of age of 21);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-217 (Supp. 1971) (an elector); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 4504(a) (Supp. 1970) (qualified voter); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01(1) (Supp. 1967) (over
21); GA. CODE ANN. § 59-106 (Supp. 1970) (registered voter); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 609-
I(I) (Supp. 1970) (qualification of voter); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-201(l) (1947) (county
NOTES
that the age for jury eligibility has been lowered to 18 in those states where
the minimum age for jury service is defined by the voting age,9 some thirty
states still preclude a young defendant from having persons of his own age
on the jury."0
elector; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 2 (1968) (21); IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-7115 (Repl. Vol.
1968) (resident voter); IOWA CODE ANN. § 607.1 (1946) (qualified elector); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 43-102 (1963) (qualifications of elector); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29.025 (Supp.
1971) (at least 18); LA. CRIMi. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 401(2) (Vest 1967) (at least 21); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14. § 1254 (Supp. 1970) (registered voter); MD. CODE ANN. art. 51,
§ 6(viii) (Supp. 1970) (21 or over); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § I (Supp. 1970) (not
under 22); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.1306(a) (Supp. 1971) (an elector); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 593.04, 628.54 (1945) (cannot be a minor); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1762 (Supp. 1968) (not
under 21); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494.010 (Supp. 1971) (over 21); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 93-1301 (Supp. 1971) (19); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (1964) (over 25); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 6.010 (1968) (qualifications of elector); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:69-1 (Supp. 1971) (over
21); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-I-I (1953) (qualified elector); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 662(2)
(McKinney 1968) (not less than 21); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3 (Repl. Vol. 1969) (21 or over);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-05(t) (Supp. 1971) (actual voter); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2313.06 (Baldwin 1964) (elector); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 28 (Supp. 1971) (21 years
of age); ORE. REV. STAT. § 10.030(c) (Repl. Vol. 1969) (over 21); PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 942
(1962) (qualified electors); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-9-9 (1969) (male over 25); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 38-52 (Supp. 1970) (over 21); S.D. CODE § 16-13.10 (1967) (qualifications of
elector); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-101 (1956) (over 21); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2133
(Supp. 1971) (over 21); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-8(1) (1953) (over 21); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-174,-175 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (over 21); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.36.070(3) (1956)
(over 21); W. 'VA. CODE ANN. § 52-1-1 (1966) (21); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 255.01(2) (1971)
(qualified elector); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-77(1) (Supp. 1971) (21). No minimum age is
specified for jury service in New Hampshire and Vermont where the selection of the jury
pool is left to the discretion of a local official. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500:1 (Repl.
Vol. 1968) (selectman's list); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 903 (Supp. 1971) (selected by jury
comm.) See also Appendix infra.
9ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-301(a) (Supp. 1971); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-101 (Supp.
1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-217 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4504(a)
(Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 59-106 (Supp. 1970); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 609-1(1)
(Supp. 1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-201(1) (1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-7115 (Repl. Vol.
1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 607.1 (1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-102 (1963); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1254 (Supp .1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.1306(a) (Supp. 1971);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 6.010 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-I (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-09.1-05(1) (Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.06 (Baldwin 1964); PA. STAT.
tit. 17, § 942 (1962); S.D. CODE § 16-13-10 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 255.01(2) (1971).
Kentucky's age for jury service was 18 prior to the ratification of the twenty-sixth amend-
ment. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29.025 (Supp. 1971).
The effect of lowering of the age to 18 is premised upon the effect which the nineteenth
amendment had in qualifying women for jury service where the status of qualified elector
was the basic test of eligibility. See United States v. Roemig, 52 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Iowa
1943).
"ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 21 (Supp. 1966); ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.010 (Supp. 1971);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-217 (Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01(1) (Supp. 1967);
GA. CODE ANN. § 59-106 (Supp. 1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 2 (1969); LA. CRIM1. PRO.
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In those jurisdictions where the problem exists," there are basically
two challenges which a young defendant can make to the constitutionality
of these statutes.' 2 In federal courts, he can challenge the federal statute
which establishes the minimum age for jury eligibility at 21 1 on the basis
that it has the effect of denying him his sixth amendment right to trial by
an impartial jury. Similarly, since the sixth amendment right to an impar-
tial jury has been made applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment,14 state statutes can be challenged in
either state or Federal courts on the ground that they also abridge this
sixth amendment right.' 5 Because this sixth amendment right is equally
applicable to the state and federal governments, subsequent discussion of
the sixth amendment impartial jury standard bears equal relevance to
state and federal statutes.
In the sixth amendment challenge to the federal or to a state statute
the court would have to decide whether or not a young defendant has an
impartial jury where all persons his own age have been excluded from jury
service. The current standard of an impartial jury has evolved from the
Supreme Court's 1880 decision in Strauder v. West Virginia,6 where the
Court declared:
CODE ANN. art. 401(2) (West 1967); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1254 (Supp. 1970);
MD. CODE ANN. art. 51, § 6(viii) (Supp. 1970); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § I (Supp.
1970); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.1306 (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 593.04, 628.54
(1945); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1762 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494.010 (Supp. 1971);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-1301 (Supp. 1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (1964); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:69-1 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 662(2) (McKinney 1968);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3 (Repl. Vol. 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 28 (Supp. 1971);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 10.030 (Repl. Vol. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-9-9 (1969); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 38-52 (Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-101 (1956); TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 2133 (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-8(I) Code Ann. § 78-46-
8(l) (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-174,175 (Repl. Vol. 1957); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2.36.070(3) (1956); W. 'VA. CODE ANN. § 52-1-1 (1966); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-77(l)
(Supp. 1971). See Appendix infra.
"Id.
IrThe first of these challenges, based upon the sixth amendment right to an impartial
jury, is discussed in the text accompanying notes 16-36 infra.The second challenge, based
upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 37-42 infra.
13See note 7 supra.
"Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518 (1968) (stating that petitioner was entitled
to an impartial jury under the sixth amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(applying the sixth amendment right to trial by jury to the states).
15While it may appear that a young defendant could also challenge the state statute on
the basis that he has been denied equal protection of the law because his sixth amendment
right to an impartial jury has been abridged when this same right has not been abridged for
all those who are over the statutory age, this challenge in reality is based solely upon the
sixth amendment right. Thus, once the court has decided whether or not the sixth amendment
right has been abridged, it would seem unnecessary to consider the equal protection question
in this context.
16100 U.S. 303 (1880).
NOTEN
The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or
equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to
determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons
having the same legal status in society as that which he holds.
17
The concept of the jury as a body of peers or equals has its historic origins
in the Magna Charta,"s but the Court went beyond peers and equals as it
developed the standard of impartiality, indicating in subsequent years that
the jury should be a body truly representative of the community." In
Glasser v. United States2' the Court first enunciated what has come to be
known as the "cross-section" rule, 21 stating in a subsequent decision that
"[t]he American tradition of trial by jury . . . necessarily contemplates
an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. ' 2  When
there existed "the admitted exclusion of an eligible class or group in the
community .... ,"23 the standard of drawing from a cross section was
not met.
With regard to the young defendant the question becomes whether
minimum age statutes exclude a class or group from jury service so as to
prevent the jury from being a truly representative body. According to
sociologist Kenneth Keniston, young people comprise a class with distinc-
tive values, outlooks, manners, roles, and behavior patterns.2 4 These dis-
tinguishing characteristics are reflected in part in young peoples' attitudes
towards drugs2 and towards compulsory military service,26 two areas that
have become increasingly prominent in criminal law. The problem is that
'11d. at 308.
18See W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CHARTA 134-38 (1914); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
THEHISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 119-22 (1895).
"See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
-'315 U.S. 60 (1942).
21id. at 86. See Note, The Congress, the Court and Jury Selection: A Critique of Title
land H of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966,52 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1109 (1966).
'2Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
2'Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
21K. KENISTON, THE UNCOMMITTED 394 (1st ed. 1965).
2In 1969 it is estimated that 77.2% of those arrested for narcotics law violations were
under 24 years of age, thereby clearly indicating that this is a youth oriented crime. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1971 at 146 (92ded. 1971).
Waiver of jury trials occurs most frequently in cases involving narcotics law violations
because of low jury leniency ratings. H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 29
(Ist ed. 1966). Conversely, liquor and drunk driving laws are unpopular among juries as
being too severe. Id. at 287. This dichotomy is perhaps indicative of an age-culture bias, as
younger juries might tend to treat narcotics laws as unpopular sumptuary laws just as older
juries have seemingly done with laws regulating the use of their drug, alcohol.
"Selective service law violations, which are most likely to be committed by those
1972]
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Keniston's definition of this class, generically designated as "youth," 27
encompasses roughly the ages from 18 to 26,28 while a young defendant,
in order to meet the cross section test of the court, must show, for
example, that young people 18 to 20 comprise an identifiable group which
should not be excluded from jury service. Even though young adults have
been recognized as a group which cannot be constitutionally excluded
from jury service,'2 some courts have stated that there is nothing identifia-
ble or distinctive about young adults in a specific age range, such as from
21 to 23, to set them apart from young adults aged 23 and over." Thus,
a court might feel that there is nothing identifiable or distinctive about
young people aged 18 through 20 to set them apart from those over the
age of 20.
Several courts have rejected challenges to the exclusion of minors from
juries apparently on the basis that there is a legislative perogative to treat
minors differently from adults.3' In George v. United States32 a minor
between the ages of 18 and 26, have increased significantly in the past 10 years.
Number of Defendants Charged with Selective Service Law Violations
Year
Number 1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
239 341 516 996 1,192 1,744 2,833
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF CONMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1971 at 257 (92d ed. 1971).
21K. KENISTON, YOUNG RADICALS 264 (1st ed. 1968).
2d.
1ln a challenge to the apparent exclusion of young adults from jury pools the First
Circuit has said that
we are satisfied that young adults constitute a cognizable-though admit-
tedly ill-defined--group for the purposes of defendant's prima facie case.
We cannot allow the requirement of a 'distinct' group to be applied so
stringently with regard to age grouping that possible discrimination
against a large class of persons-in our case, those between 21 and
34-will be insulated from attack. Nor can we close our eyes to the con-
temporary national preoccupation with a 'generation gap,' which creates
the impression that the attitudes of young adults are in some sense distinct
from older adults.
United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 570 (Ist Cir. 1970).
'United States v. Kuhn, 441 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1971); see King v. United States,
346 F.2d 123, 124 (1st Cir. 1965).
"United States v. Tantash, 409 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 967 (1969);
King v. United States, 346 F.2d 123 (Ist Cir. 1965); George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952); cf United States v. McVean, 436 F.2d 1120,
1122 (5th Cir. 1971).
32l96 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952).
NOTES
defendant who was under indictment for violation of the Selective Service
Act of 1948 challenged the exclusion of minors from the grand jury. The
Ninth Circuit rejected the challenge, upholding the right of Congress to
exclude minors from jury service& and expressing the view that minors
could not be eligible for jury service because they would have no place on
juries which deal with offenses committed by adults,
[for, as to adults, minors would represent not a part of the cross
section of the country, but a whollyjbreign group unrelated to the
adult stream which dominates American life.
34
While the Supreme Court has stated in dicta that a legislature may
restrict jury eligibility on the basis of age,3 it has never considered whether
age standards would violate the concept of the impartial jury as stated in
Strauder.36 If a court places primary emphasis on the concept of the jury
as a body composed of those having the same legal status in society as
the defendant, it may find that the young defendant has been denied an
impartial jury by the exclusion of persons who, like himself, are too old
to be tried in the juvenile system. Therefore, the court might decide that
these young persons are members of an identifiable group within the
community and that the exclusion of this group will be said to violate the
cross-section standard.
It is possible to assert the challenge to a state statute in different
terminology, relying upon the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal
protection of the law.3 7 A young defendant could assert that the state has
denied him equal protection because, as against all other defendants who
are over the minimum statutory age for jury service, he, as a person under
that age, had no opportunity to have persons his own age on his jury.38
Here the young defendant would claim that age qualifications discrimi-
nate unreasonably against his class.
wld. at 453.
341d. at 454.
-Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 310 (1880).
"See text accompanying note 39 infra.
37See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). It may be
possible upon the same facts and analysis to make an "equal protection" argument against
the federal statute. While the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the federal govern-
ment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the due process clause of the fifth amendment as
forbidding discriminatory classifications which are so unjustifiable that they are violative
of due process. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969); Schnieder v. Rusk, 377
U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954).
38See note 5 supra.
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In determining whether or not the state had created a classification
which unreasonably discriminated against young people the court would
decide first, if the classification was a permissible exercise of state power
and second, if the classification had a reasonable relation to the intended
purpose. 9 The Supreme Court has held that states may validly promul-
gate standards for qualification for jury service,40 the general rule being
that as long as the classification is not totally irrelevant to the purpose of
the statute, that is, as long as some rational nexus can be found, the
statute will be upheld.4
When the defendant asserts that equal protection has been denied him
as against other defendants who have an opportunity to have persons of
their own age on the jury, he is claiming that the statute setting a mini-
mum age for jury service results in "under-inclusion." This result has
been said to occur
when a state benefits or burdens persons in a manner that furthers
a legitimate public purpose but does not confer this same benefit
or place this same burden on others who are similarly situated .
2
The argument can thus be made that the state has burdened a young
defendant by excluding persons of his age from jury service when it has
not so burdened other defendants.
The ultimate success of this challenge, then, will depend upon the
ability of a young defendant to show that he has been burdened when other
defendants have not. It seems that the only burden which he can show is
that persons his own age have been excluded from eligibility for jury
service, which in reality is merely another way of saying that an identifia-
ble class has been excluded. Therefore, there seems to be no practical
difference between the equal protection and the sixth amendment chal-
lenge to the state statute.
If either of these challenges should be successful, a court would have
to consider several practical problems. In the challenge based upon the
39See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621,632-33 (1969); McLaugh-
lin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). See also Developments in the Law-Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1077-84 (1969).
"The Court stated in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880), that a state
could prescribe qualifications for jury service and in doing so could make discriminations
within the limits of the fourteenth amendment.
41See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); Inter-
national Harvester Co. of America v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 215 (1914); Metropolis
Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 70 (1913); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
1
2Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1084 (1969).
See, e.g.. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 3894 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
[Vol. XXIX
NOTES
sixth amendment to either a state or the federal statute, a court would
have to decide what new minimum age for jury service would not violate
the impartial jury standard. With regard to a successful equal protection
challenge to a state statute, the court in balancing competing interests
must determine the specific age at which the state interest will again
predominate. A possible solution to this problem is to make the minimum
age for jury service coincide with the age at which criminal courts assume
jurisdiction from juvenile courts.
A second problem is that lowering the age for jury service may involve
large numbers of people in high school or college, or with pending military
obligations. The exigencies of a long trial may conflict with these situa-
tions. On the other hand, to exempt these young people from jury service
will greatly reduce the pool of available young jurors.
A third possible problem of lowering the age of criminal jury eligibility
involves the impact upon civil juries. The question arises as to whether the
state and federal government could maintain the minimum age for civil
juries at the existing level. It seems, however, that the standard of the
impartial jury based upon the cross-section of the community is equally
applicable to civil and criminal proceedings whenever a jury is provided.
3
The practical effect, then, of a successful challenge by a young defendant
would seem to be to lower the age for jury service for both criminal and
civil juries.
Despite these practical problems, it appears that the argument can still
be made against the constitutionality of these statutes. Notwithstanding
the previous rulings on this issue, the question may continue to be raised
and perhaps the problem should be re-evaluated. The sixth amendment
standard of an impartial jury may be violated by excluding from eligibility
for jury service those young people who no longer fall within the protec-
tion of the juvenile court. While there would be some difficulty in estab-
lishing that these young people constitute an indentifiable class, this class
may well be defined as those subject to the criminal court system who are
denied the opportunity to have persons of their own age on the jury.
In addition, this special class of defendants may have been so unrea-
sonably discriminated against that they have been denied equal protection
of the law. The possibility of disadvantage accruing from this discrimina-
tion is only speculative, but there is some question as to whether middle-
aged and middle-class jurors can sit in judgment of a young selective
service law violator and fairly evaluate his case, or whether wage earners
can objectively hear the case of a long-haired campus radical.
To promote the legitimacy of our legal system and to assure that juries
may be truly representative of the community, it would seem that efforts
'7hiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
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are needed to lower present minimum jury age requirements where they
exclude the class of young people who no longer enjoy the protection of
the juvenile court system. While it is possible that problems may arise in
lowering the jury age requirements and that these problems may best be
handled by legislative action, unless such action is forthcoming some
impetus should be judicially supplied.
PHILIP BLAIR DUNDAS, JR.
APPENDIX
State Minimum Jury Age Minimum Mandatorya Age Group of




































































































a. This column does not account for cases where the juvenile court may waive its jurisdic-
tion and the state may try a minor as an adult where a serious crime has been committed;
nor does it account for the situation where a minor who has reached the minimum manda-
tory age of criminal court jurisdiction may nonetheless be tried as a juvenile for a violation
of the law committed while he was a juvenile.







17 (male), 18 (female)
18
16
18
18
18
18
18
19
18-21
18-25
17-21
18-21
17-21 (male, 18-21
(female)
18-21
18-21
18-21
18-20
18-20
19-20
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Federal Courts
